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Literary cratyism: *Thymos* against *Menis*

Abstract

This article is an observation of Platonic inclination to control and plan literary creativity. Such a proclivity will be noted by analysing some elements of its fundamental philosophical concepts, which relate to literary art in *Cratylus*, *Pheadrus* and *Republic*, as dialogue-works. The analysis will focus on his denial of naturalness of language, writing, and imaginative and creative freedom, as well as his intention to establish the institution of control or censorship. We will also discuss the projection of the ideological future of literary writing and emphasise that this tendency has assumed an atemporal character. We will notice how some of the platonic elements of the desire for control over literary art were exploited by the method of socialist realism, which, as such, requires the creation of literature planning by escaping from the agon of the tradition. As a counterbalance, we will emphasize the immanence of freedom of literary expressiveness based on the concept of *thymos*, precisely proposed by Plato.

Keywords: Plato, censorship, cratyism, hermogenism, thymos, socialist realism

Introduction

Hatred of literature has existed since its birth, so we are dealing with the phenomenon of a generic primordiality of conflict between *cratyism* and *hermogenism*¹. If cratyism is the use of linguistic gift to express emotion, emotionality, imagination and naturalness, even by naming and name-giving, hermogenism is the use of linguistic gift to express rationality, accuracy, politics or arbitrariness, through name-giving. Cratyism aims at

¹ *Cratyism* and *hermogenism* are notions, which stem from the names of the characters of Plato's *Cratylus* dialogue, which discusses the philosophy of name-giving. Under the tutelage of Socrates, who is Plato's alter-ego, Cratylus defends the idea that names are natural, while Hermogenes defends the idea that names are arbitrary.

motivated names pre-based on human phenomena and nature and divine inspiration by seeing language as a sacred source, while hermogenism advocates the idea of social agreement on name-giving, functional language and overall human communication as a need for scientific accuracy. The source of this conflict turns out to be the human being himself, and, in its essence, “soul-body” (Sedley 2003: 96) possesses both i.e. the sacral and the scientific.

This hatred of motivated language is reinforced by Plato in the *Cratylus* dialogue doubting on his metaphysical inspiration, „leaving” the whole linguistic expression at the service of functional communication for centuries, and its naturalness as a substratum of human communication or simply a departure from standardized linguistic legitimacy, as an emotional inferiority or simply, as Gerard Genette dubs it, in a “nickname” or “eponymy” (Genette 1995: 16–17). Does literature live in the narrow linguistic space of eponymy permanently challenging the arbitrary human discourse?

However, Mladen Dolar thinks that eponymy or sound symbolism, which carries concepts of cratylism, exceeds the arbitrariness of the name, because we have “no name without a specter. Naming is evoking a phantom, conjuring a ghost” (Dolar 2014: 32).

Plato acknowledges the eternal nature of things, the philosophy of flux, even a kind of truth in divine inspiration, but when confronted with linguistic inspiration, through the voice of Socrates, who sometimes is his alter-ego, he emphasized:

So whether I’m right about these things or whether the truth lies with Heraclitus and many others isn’t an easy matter to investigate. But surely no one with any understanding will commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to names, or trust them and their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows something—condemning both himself and the things that are to be totally unsound like leaky sinks—or believe that things are exactly like people with runny noses, or that all things are afflicted with colds and drip over everything. It’s certainly possible that things are that way, *Cratylus*, but it is also possible that they are not. So you must investigate them courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything easily—you are still young and in your prime, after all. Then after you’ve investigated them, if you happen to discover the truth, you can share it with me. (Plato 1997: 156).

To Plato, the essence of rejection of eternal linguistic inspiration does not imply the non-existence of ideal forms or ideal truth, which Plato aimed for in the teleological domain, part of which may be language as human primordially, but unhealthy state of unreality, a concept that captures the

mode of linguistic use, which can lead to moralistic deviations.

In addition, Socrates suggests to Cratylus that he should reflect and not easily accept such a doctrine, suggesting his ‚journey‘ to find the truth.

Weren‘t the artists from Plato‘s ideal state expelled just like Cratylus, because they couldn‘t find, didn‘t tell or did not aim for the truth?

Terry Eagleton emphasizes this philosophy of doubt by stating that “Plato was suspicious of art because it struck him as a pale reflection of a thing, which was in turn a pale reflection of an Idea” (Eagleton 2024: 59).

Doubt on language inspiration, as a basic literary means and motivation thereof, takes place in the instances of arbitrariness, which always crave control via ideological doctrines, which could not tolerate imaginative literature, because it touched upon instances of metaphysics, which were felt and understood only by the philosopher.

Such an intention is best reflected in *The Republic*, where Plato states that artists lie and, since they lie, the institution of censorship should be inaugurated to supervise the authors that create and deny the authors they have created.

The author‘s prior existence as the carrier of the narrative of a world with strong divine elements is only allowed if approved by the institution of censorship proposed by Plato, taking as an example the works of the most famous authors of the ancient Greek literary tradition, Hesiod and Homer, as follows:

“First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make a fine tale, it must be approved, but if it‘s not, it must be rejected.

„Which sort?“ he said.

„In the greater tales we‘ll also see the smaller ones,“ I said. „For both the greater and the smaller must be taken from the same model and have the same power...

„I do,“ he said. „But I do not grasp what you mean by the greater ones. „

„The ones Hesiod and Homer told us, and the other poets too.

They surely composed false tales for human beings and used to tell them and still do tell them.“ (Plato 1991: 55).

The quest for a model of representation of concepts of life, death, cosmos as a universal category of human preoccupation, but also the quest for a model to control the truth, only one truth, seems as a tendency to limit the phenomenon of imagination or creativity of literary authorship.

Its appears that this phenomenon was conducive to the redefinition of the very concept of literary author and hatred against the essential freedom of literary discursiveness at the same time.

To delve further into the systematics of control, such a phenomenon can

also be noticed in the debate on the very proclaimed invention of writing, an invention which Plato, in his work *Phaedrus*, qualifies as *pharmakon* i.e. a cure and a poison, a means that damages memory and detaches the being from the truth, through simulacrum. Such a conviction assumes a political nature, because the truth must be given by the Authority, be it God, King, Father, etc., say, from a controlling and moralizing instance, such as King Amon in the concrete case, whom the Greeks call Theus and who was known for his care for *idolatry*, a philosophical example which Plato admires, through the voice of Socrates, as follows:

So anyone who thinks he can get a branch of expertise to survive by committing it to writing – and also anyone who inherits the work with the assumption that writing will give him something clear and reliable – would be behaving in a thoroughly foolish manner and really would be ignorant of Amon's prediction, if he supposed that written words could do more than jog the memory of someone who already knows the topic that has been written about. (Plato 2003: 69).

This phenomenon is strongly observed by the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, who says about Plato:

Writing has no essence or value of its own, whether positive or negative. It plays within simulacrum. It is in its type the mime of memory, of knowledge, of truth etc. That is why men of writing appear before the eye of God not as wise men (*sophoi*) but in truth as fake or self-proclaimed men (*doxosophoi*). (Derrida 1983: 63–84).

We already have three concepts of Plato, the anti-motivationality of language or *hermogenism* (*Cratylus*), the writing simulacrum or *pharmakon* (*Phaedrus*) as well as in the plan of *singer of tales*, such as Homer, the request for *ensorship* and care for moral (*The Republic*).

The censorship of the Homeric heritage, the denial of language cratylism as well as denial of the truth of writing, which is considered as a substitution of memory, may be the creation of a groundwork for ideological concentration or establishment of ideology as an epistemic cluster, as opposed to freedom of literary discursiveness, which, looking at the chronology of Plato's works, are forged as ideas at the time when his academy was established, hence in the years 388–367, and remain the same, in generally noticeable variants, in all of his works.

For instance, Homer is considered the author of epic works *The Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but since “Homer left none of his poems in writing” (Vico 1948: 285), his authorship is strengthened by the ability to carry what Parry calls the singer of tales, the mediator of the inherited metaphysical and

physical worlds, and even Vico says that Homer speaks motivated by the bosom of metaphysics, just as other rhapsodes who sang Homer's songs on the streets of Athens were motivated, and that Homer as we know him today was a "tier or putter together of fables" (Vico 1948: 285). Because "the practice of oral narrative poetry makes a certain form necessary; the way in which oral epic songs are composed and transmitted leaves its unmistakable mark on the song. That mark is apparent in the formulas and in the themes" (Lord 1971: 141). Moreover, "in Homer, the problem of language consists in distinguishing, and in explaining the presence of forms, words, and constructions of archaic, Aeolic, Ionic, artificial, and possibly even ,Achaean' origin, which appear in the text of the Iliad and the Odyssey" (Parry 1971: 6).

This is a bit paradoxical, when it is known that Plato insists in *eidos*, the eternal, demands censoring the parts of the songs carried by Homer, which have metaphysical provenience, because, as such, they preserve the elements of human primordiality supplemented even by the later historic and social intertextuality, as a generic phenomenon of the epic. This tendency can be explained by Plato's utopian desire for ideal and moralizing power, by his measure, so that, above the institution of censorship, such a work can enter into the ideological process of political validation, where authorship is perceived as a creation of a designable literary world rather than a transfer or responsibility of a form pre-based on discourses that observe the "dialogic nature of language" (Bakhtin 2008: 273).

In addition, since it was thought that "language is of a divine origin, because poetic truth is metaphysical truth" (Vico 1948: 66) and it was born as poetry, and poets are the forerunners of philosophers, so is Plato the philosopher, who wants to reduce the motivatability of language and turn it only into the functionality of communication, leaving the literary heritage only within certain linguistic and symbolic devices, as may be the elements of sound symbolism. The divine motivation of language, however, also implies the divine motivation of poets, who, in different circles, called *kyklos*, had "preserved all the fabulous history of Greece", as did Hesiod, who in his writings "contains all the fables of the gods, is earlier than Homer" (Vico 1948: 286).

In addition, despite the self-reducing character of writing, Plato sees it as a tool against memory and, consequently, it seems that memory belongs only to the trinity of God, King and consequently Philosopher, the latter projected as supreme and valid leader of the ideal state.

Despite the fact that human history and, consequently, cultural history

has refuted, challenged and denied linguistic arbitrariness, writing as *pharmakon* and *ensorship* and a search of a didactic-moralizing written model, Plato's ideas as a spectrum of influence have affected cultural and political systems, which aimed at, pursued and exercised control of truthiness. This spectrum of Plato and the philosopher-authors of antiquity have already created philosophical and literary discursiveness from their discourses, gaining the power of atemporality. The dangers posed by literature were designed along this road and the tendency to reduce literary discursiveness and its control has been strengthened at the same time. This phenomenon is also noticed by Michel Foucault, who, by denying the tendencies of discursive reduction, be it through the author or through a censorship over an author, says: "There are reasons dealing with the 'ideological' status of the author. The question then becomes: How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world? The answer is: One can reduce it with the author" (Foucault 2000: 186). This philosophy becomes valid also owing to the fact that the status of the author or authorship has not changed much from Antiquity to the present.

Thymos

However, in this case, we must also discuss the phenomenon of *thymos*, which constitutes one of the three forms of human *psyche*. In *The Republic*, there is a question that Socrates asks Glaucon about *thymos* (spiritedness), which resists fear resulting in human disobedience to pressures that limit human sensitivity and immanence to be known and appreciated by others:

"Haven't you noticed how irresistible and unbeatable spirit² is, so that its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything?"

„Yes, I have noticed it.” (Plato 1991: 52–449).

If, according to Plato's philosophical concept, the human spirit (*psyche*) consists of the trinity of *logos*, *epithymia* and *thymos*, then what is left to *thymos*?

As is well known, despite the express ambiguities of the ancient Greek, *logos* implies its rationality and expression in speech and then also in writing, while *epithymia* expresses desire or even the somatic need, where-

² The word here is *thymos*, and it expresses one of the most important notions in the book. *Thymos* is the principle or seat of anger or rage. It might well be translated by that pregnant word "heart," which mirrors the complexity of the Greek. It will always be translated as "spirit" or "spiritedness".

as *thymos* signifies the sensitivity that emanates from the human heart or spirituality.

If to Plato's philosophy *logos* has a mimetic character, because *eidōs* remains the essential, and if somatics or epithymia is an escape from morality and the necessary purification of the soul, consequently punishable by the deities, then why is literary discourse attacked, be it created and transmitted orally or through the motivation of writing, a discourse which lives precisely in the realm of human complexity of *thymos*? Is *thymos* that category of spirituality, of imagination, which, despite the whole will for censorship, it cannot be censored?

These questions, which relate to *thymos* and its value in human life, are proved valid owing to the very fact of a continued denial of *thymos* by any ideological system that claims to create a single model of truth, be it social, political or religious. Because, „this third part of the soul, *thymos*, is the seat of today's identity politics“ (Fukuyama 2018: 21) and it seems that it has always been so, but in different variations.

The denial of *thymos* causes a deep crisis in the human being, a phenomenon which is observed right at the heart of European literature by the scholar Peter Sloterdijk, who takes the example of *The Rage of the Achilles* in *The Iliad*, his wrath, that is, the thymotic verses, which explain the motive for the outbreak of the nine-year Trojan War. Hence, disregard for the spiritual (*thymos*) causes rage (*menis*), which is observed in the Homeric mytho-poetic verses:

Rage-Goddess, sing the rage of Peleus' son Achilles,
Murderous, doomed, that cost the Achaeans countless losses,
hurling down to the House of Death so many sturdy souls,
great fighters' souls, but made their bodies carrion,
feasts for the dogs and birds,
and the will of Zeus was moving, toward its end,
Begin, Muse, when the two first broke and clashed,
Agamemnon lord of men and brilliant Achilles. (Homer 1990: 77).

Even with the blessing of the Gods, disrespect of *thymos* that reflects rage sends many warrior souls to the Hades. Starting with the introductory verses of Homer's *Iliad*, Sloterdijk examines and emphasizes the forms of *rage*, which in European civilization have erupted as a result of denial or tendency to control the third part of the human soul, the *thymos*. Moreover, also in our time “what contemporary social philosophy discussed with varying success under the heading „intersubjectivity“ often means just the op-

position and the interplay of thymotic centers of tension” (Sloterdijk 2010: 22). Rage has broken out when ideologems have denied personal dignity and ethnic identity, but also when ideology has produced revolutions to control the human *thymos*.

Viewed in this dimension, disrespect of *thymos* also causes the rage of Črtomir, the hero of the Slovenian national epic poem, *The Baptism on the Savica* (1836), authored by France Prešern, who strongly retains the intention of *thymos*. Moreover, “intertextually, *The Baptism on the Savica* evokes Western epics and topoi. It refers to Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Tasso with meaningfully selected strophic forms (terza rima and stanzas), Homeric comparisons, borrowed epic motives (laying siege, the rousing address before a hopeless battle with a stronger enemy, fratricidal massacre, the figure of a religiously haloed virgin), and, most importantly, the theme of the historical demise of a civilization and the birth of another” (Juvan 2015: 387).

Also, by analogy, in the epic poem *The Highland Lute* (1937) by the Franciscan author, Gjergj Fishta, we have the following verses:

Help me God as you once helped me,
Five hundred years are now behind us
Since Albania the fair was taken,
Since and Turks snared and enslaved her,
Left in blood our wretched homeland,
Let suffocate and wither
That she no more glimpse the sunlight,
That she ever live in sorrow,
That, when beaten, she kept silent.
Mice within the walls wept for her,
Serpents under stones took pity! (Fishta 2005: 3).

So, if Homer sings to Achilles’ *menis*, Gjergj Fishta, also described as the Albanian Homer, sings to the century-old Albanian suffering, as a consequence of Ottoman occupation, and seeks the help of God, which takes the form of the transposition of Deity and, consequently, in both literary texts of the rhapsodic legacy we detect the philosophy of highlighting the human demand to respect the *thymos*.

Catering for the appreciation of this human essence ensures harmony, while the absence of care for the *thymos*, for any dignity and identity, personal and collective, produces, at different times, different crises and conflicts, which literature has established in its very basic forms.

***Thymos* and ideological censorship**

The absence of *thymos* limits the freedom of imagination and, consequently, causes the *menis* of the authors, but also of the readers, cultivated with the immanent human demand for fiction. From the *menis* comes about “an aesthetic rejection” (Rugova 1987: 7–20) that is a denial of the schematization of writing and a denial of a certain stylistic and thematic ideology. Author’s and reader’s request to enter into the depths of imagination aesthetically rejects the absence of *thymos* in literature. This can then lead to other rejections, such as denial of censorship, control and, consequently, any form of oppression, for it, essentially, limits the fundamental freedom of the human being. The phenomenon of turning literary authors through *thymos* into anti-totalitarian politicians is not accidental in some of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe,³ where culture is transformed into politics precisely with the awareness of the protection of the individual and social rights.

However, when the *menis* is suppressed and ideological control of the *thymos* takes place, then the realization of utopia takes place, consequently the phenomenon of adaptation, an ideal of any form of control, in the field of literature or even politics, where an ideological authority is required as the last instance of cultural and political validation.

Seen in retrospect, we can hypothesize that some elements of Platonic philosophy of control over artists and art in general were recalibrated and reinterpreted in the relationship between ideology and literature at the time of domination of last century’s one-party systems, largely established in Eastern Europe. This phenomenon, of continuity to control in life and literature alike, is researched by the philosopher Popper, who points out that:

In our own time of still more rapid change, we even find the desire not only to predict change, but to control it by centralized large-scale planning. These holistic views (which I have criticized in *The Poverty of Historicism*) represent a compromise, as it were, between Platonic and Marxian theories. Plato’s will to arrest change, combined with Marx’s doctrine of its inevitability, yield, as a kind of Hegelian ‘synthesis’, the demand that since it cannot be entirely arrested, change should at least be ‘planned’, and controlled by the state whose power is to be vastly extended. (Popper 1947: 408).

The “compromise” between Platonic and Marxist theories in the ide-

³ A typical example is the writer Vaclav Havel (1936–2011) who through cultural dissidence became the leader of democracy in the Czech Republic, consequently a denier of anti-totalitarian systems.

ological lens, which has launched the method of socialist realism, can be seen as a simplified re-interpretation of the basic ideas of Plato's artistic planning in the new time, putting the *thymos* under the pressure of *menis*.

Comparison of ideologemes

Linguistic anti-motivation, allowing artistic texts which aim at only one truth, retouching the literary tradition as well as absence of *thymos*, both for the author and the society, can be considered as basic elements for the method of socialist realism that necessarily translate Plato's concepts into diachrony. We are aware of the vague concept of similarity and comparisons but:

If Plato denied the motivation of language in the dialogue *Cratylus*, he consequently sought its reduction only in direct communication, as a struggle against the figure. Socrealism writing liked literary works which, through clear and unambiguous discourse, strengthen a thesis or a meaning, a truth, which must be accepted by the reader as ideological didacticism, where language „dares not“ confuse the conveyance of the idea i.e. there is no need for tropology.

If Plato in *Phaedrus* did not believe in the invention of writing and considered it a means of recollection, which damages memory, in the case of the method of socialist realism memory it belongs to the Authority, the leader, the philosopher of the authority or the spiritual leader. In this path, socialist realism writing was seen in two dimensions: as a tool for the recollection of the working class, the proletariat and the heroism of the overthrow of classes, whereas, when it emerged from such an intention, the writing, instead of being related to the past, was seen as a tool that shapes the future or cultural, social and political planning.

If Plato's ideas in *The Republic* can be seen as clues or tendencies to establishing censorship, the re-censorship of socialist realism has escalated to the extent that it has created an atmosphere of murder and atrocity. This negative and anti-individualist mechanism is also condemned by the Nobel laureate, Česlav Miloš, how has observed as follows:

Socrealism..., for it is based on the glorification of the state by the writer and artist, whose task it is to portray the power of the state as the greatest good, and to scorn the sufferings of the individual. It is thus an effective anaesthetic. (Milosz 1960: 10).

Such an *effective anaesthetics* is unnatural in the very essence of art, because art in general, be it as mimetics or creation of an autotelic world,

originates from the individual, upon whom the individual *thymos* is necessarily imparted, and is, consequently, a crisis of ideologies. On the other hand, the persistence in a pseudo-aesthetics, which tries to strengthen and glorify power, is a generic blunder in relation to the very nature of art, an intentional negative deconstruction of historical evolution and a lack of respect for individual freedom. This necessarily leads to an ingratiating writing where there is no realism, but fantasy and clichés for the protection and strengthening of totalitarian power, consequently turning literary writing into a means to preserve power as a teleological goal.

If socialist realism meant the achievement of a Purpose, the literature, as a social activity of the writer, would necessarily be put on the way of the achievement of that Purpose, which was the creation of Paradise on earth by seeing the Leader as the substitute of the Transcendental One or God, who should not, in any way whatsoever, be mocked or found to have any flaws. So:

It is, after all, the Party that leads us to the Purpose in accordance with all the rules of Marxism-Leninism, the Party that lives and works in constant contact with God. And so, we have in it and in its leader the wisest and most experienced guide, who is competent in all questions of industry, linguistics, music, philosophy, painting, biology, etc. He is our Commander, our Ruler, our High Priest. To doubt his word is as sinful as to doubt the will of God. (Tertz 1960: 42).

Doubt in the word of the Leader is equivalent to the doubt in the will of God. In this vein, the Authority Number One is consolidated as a synthesizer of social, cultural, political, military and religious hierarchy, in a cult of ideo-identification with God, whereas, as to inherited doctrines, they are replaced by the doctrine of the Party. Within this philosophy of control, the care for censorship of authors is motivated by the Leader, who constantly engages in „soul engineering“ on his path to creating the „new man“.

For instance, we have the example of one of the most dictatorial leaders in Europe, Enver Hoxha, who, ideologically vested with the knowledge of many discourses, read, allowed, denied and punished the authors of literature, because he had been playing, for a long time, the role of the first reader of manuscripts of their works that were coming either as a gift or from the Association of Writers and Artists, which played the role of propaganda, persuasion and control through literary production. And, in this way, the tasks assigned require a protective implementation and materialization:

Under the leadership of the Party, the League of Writers and Artists should intensify its work for the ideoaesthetic and professional education of writers and artists, becoming even more a centre where creative work is encouraged and its philosophical, ethical, and esthetical problems are widely threshed out from the standpoint of proletarian partisanship. (Hoxha 1977: 154).

Educating writers and artists through party doctrine means assigning tasks to care for the Leader, who cannot be contested in any instance, consequently his non-contestation implies an implicit demand for his sacred portrayal, as a substitute to a divine force. God is no longer in the Olympus or in the imaginary realms of Paradise, but is on earth and preserves his image of God as „visible nowhere but present everywhere“ even as an *Imago Dei*.

Thymos and the spiritual freedom of the writer, which in the moment of acceptance to be „educated“ is replaced by the adaptation and ideological and moralizing function required by the God-Leader, who should not be undermined. Undermining him, even for parody or satire purposes, within the aesthetics of these two forms, means denial of the work and life of the writer.⁴

Viewed as a phenomenon or as a return to diachrony, there are some similarities with Plato's demand in his work *The Republic*, where, in Socrates' discussion with Glaucon on the forms of law and truth over the philosophemes of idealistic morals, its placement is required, according to arguments, which spring from the institution of inquiry.

„Nothing great is easy,‘ we'll say. ‚But at all events, if we are going to be happy, we must go where the tracks of the arguments lead. For, as to getting away with it, we'll organize secret societies and clubs; and there are teachers of persuasion who offer the wisdom of the public assembly and the court. On this basis, in some things we'll persuade and in others use force; thus, we'll get the better and not pay the penalty. ‚But it surely isn't possible to get away from the gods or overpower them.‘ ‚But, if there are no gods, or if they have no care for human things, why should we care at all about getting away? (Plato 1991: 41).

Arguments or evidence of violation of human moral and utilitarianism, then the distinction between what is right and what is wrong as well as what is valid for youth and what is unethical as education for them no

⁴ For the violence exerted against the writers who refused to be “educated” and accept the method of socialist realism in Albanian literature, a refusal that was paid by death, see: Zef Pllumi: *Rrno vetem per me tregue*, [Live to Tell], Publishing House 55, Tirana, 2006.

longer derive from metaphysics, but from philosopher as a moral legislator.

Such re-dimensioning loses the primordial connection of man with the Deities, as an imagination, because the Platonic doctrine of the quest for the truth reaches the level of doubt in the divine power, but even if this power exists, then, for the sake of the doctrine, its punishment is accepted. The concept of arbitrariness is also required in the field of artistic imagination, so there is a tendency to limit the motivated language, to control the writing and to turn the author into a „soldier“ of doctrinal moral.

Shifted, hence, in time, this philosophy suggests the active writer of the proletariat at the time of the domination of the method of socialist realism whose text would be allowed by the educational-progressive scheme of the censoring apparatus. The obedient and controllable poet, in the name of the moral that should be sent to the metaphysics and that does not stem from the metaphysics, becomes the philosophical leitmotif for both systems of censorship in different spaces and times, but with an approximate phenomenology of hatred against the freedom of expression, say, a literary demonic phenomenology, where *cratylism* substitutes *hegemony* and where writing is no longer for the memory, but for the recollection as a retouching of the past and where the literary text should be written only if it has a Purpose, consequently a doctrinal-ideological education.

The scholar William Marx, elaborating on the generic hatred against the freedom of literary expressiveness, has marked four basic types of trials that were conducted against it historically and phenomenologically: trials by authority, trials by the defense of the truth, trials by moral and trials by society. These epistemological fields always turn out to have a controlling authority, so, in fact, we are dealing only with the forms of manifestation of authority as the goal of metaphysical control, control of argument or persuasion through the control of message, control of moral laws and control of society through indoctrination. Hence, the phenomenon exists and has already taken an atemporal form, exactly as the researcher notes:

Despite the fact that the four trials perpetually faced by literature are repeated century after century, the same arguments being rehashed with infinite, minor variations, they are not evenly distributed throughout history: there are specific time periods in which a certain trial, a certain argument, or a certain indictment is more likely to be heard, though not to the exclusion of the others. (Marx 2018: 185).

And one of the trials of literary motivated expression, of its *cratylism* and *thymos*, was tried and tested through the method of socialist realism,

which, in its controlling and planning framework, whether consciously or unconsciously, makes the phenomenon of the trial of authority current again, which is evident in the works of Plato that we discussed above, especially in terms of tendency of hermogenism of art in general.

The consequences of that trial, especially in smaller identity cultures, are patent even today. The return to the tradition becomes utilitarian, even for the sake of the naturalness of the freedom of discourses, their circulation without the fear of the institution of censorship that wants to replace the myth, God and the imaginary as an immanent literary figuration with God. This means that protecting literary discourses from censorship means protecting the human being i.e. humanity.

The fantasy of instrumentalizing religiosity, ideal forms as a destination of immortality of human soul to strengthen the Philosopher, the King, the One, and turn it into an instance of control and catering for individual and collective truth, has resulted in the denial of the primordial human need to interconnect „the myth with dreaming“ (Campbell 2004: 3–23) and the immanent need to imitate and imagine, even if the latter is a permanent illusion. Despite differences in time and space, the method of socialist realism, as a censorship method, in many respects, maintains the concepts of censorship established in the Western culture by some ideological punctums established and reinterpreted based on the Platonic philosophy.

Conclusion

In this article, through the method of text analysis, we have observed some elements of the dialogues or Plato's works *Cratylus*, *Phaedrus* and *The Republic*, emphasizing the discursive layers that problematize the issue of the curve of hatred against the freedom of literary expression. We have observed that the search for ideal eternal forms or intention to establish a single truth about human behavior through moralistic principles and metaphysical will has led to the hatred and establishment of the philosophical instance of censorship against literary discursiveness. Such censorship has resulted in the tendency to deny the naturalness of language, its philosophy (*Cratylus*), then in the denial of the value of writing compared with the power of the word of the ruling instance (*Phaedrus*) and, in the last instance, in the tendency to censor the literature of tradition and the doctrinal planning of subsequent literature (*The Republic*).

We have also noticed that these concepts, although distant in time and space, have found indirect application in the method of socialist realism,

which manifested its hatred against literary freedom in the demand for purposeful literature as an ideological education.

The aim of this article was to testify, via some concrete examples, to the atemporal existence of the phenomenon of censorship. As an antidote to this phenomenon, we have proposed the observance of individual and social *thymos* as a departure from totalitarianism in literature and as an immanent need of the human being to preserve the imaginative freedom of the literary creator through literary expressiveness. Creative imagination as human immanence is the teleological goal of literature.

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