Atanas Natev

Every anniversary marked on the calendar implies some new expression of respect for the work that has left its mark on human history. But while this is sometimes due to the simple similarity between dates, the centenary of G. V. Plekhanov's birth has a different, very different meaning. Widely celebrated by the Soviet and progressive world community, this anniversary fully confirmed the recent desire to boldly master and more fairly reevaluate Plekhanov's philosophical and aesthetic legacy.

It is unlikely that there will be another theoretical question that is met with as much distrust as the question of beauty and the aesthetic. The difficulties of aesthetics in its development serve as the main argument of those who do not want science to interfere in the area of ​​the beautiful and aesthetic evaluations. For the beautiful, the exquisite and the artistic "there can be no science, only criticism" - this statement of Kant has been repeated on a variety of occasions and in the most diverse variants to this day. I do not want to say that everyone who doubts the possibilities of the theory of the aesthetic is necessarily a Kantian. But the fact is that distrust of aesthetics is mainly shown by those who dispute the objectivity of beauty, the aesthetic and the artistic.

The viewer gains the right to like or dislike a drama very easily - in exchange for the detached control of his theater ticket. But who gave a critic the right to occupy readers at length with his impressions of one or another work? His acknowledged aesthetic taste Or his ability to present his considerations in an engaging manner? It has always seemed to me very immodest to some people to pass harsh judgments on the taste of others - this one did not have good taste, that one did! It is immodest because in such cases a person silently turns his own attitude towards art into a unit of measure of taste. How could you judge whether the critic's artistic sense is good if you yourself are not convinced that your aesthetic taste is not inferior to it? A significant work of art affects many people not because they have "unified" their tastes, but because it has discovered such an aspect of life that can excite people with the most diverse thoughts, feelings and moods. We often say that art is not a "world closed in on itself." But we do not always think to add that the work of art becomes "world for us" thanks to its ability to connect with the personal, unique life (emotional and intellectual) experience of each of us. And from this it follows: there is no "authoritative" personal taste. Personal taste is the inalienable right of the reader, viewer or listener to experience the work of art - to connect it directly with what he himself was, is or strives to be. This is why in art several different and yet correct interpretations of the same image are possible. Hence the rights of one's own opinion in criticism. It would be risky to demand from it a single "interpretation" of the work of art. But does this mean that there is complete relativity of critical assessments, almost reaching arbitrariness? Is there not a limit beyond which interpretations cease to be well-founded and correct?

It is obvious that the latest structural trends in cinematography cannot be defined without comparing them with similar trends in literature. Leaving aside narrowly professional passions (the greater the more dubious the novelty of an artistic phenomenon), the so-called "author's film" of recent times makes the question of whether the prior literary discovery of the image is a condition and - if so - to what extent it could retain its literary character in its cinematic reproduction once again relevant.

The long-standing exceptional interest shown in our country in Soviet literary studies is beyond doubt. For the representatives of Marxism in the previous few decades it has been so obvious that it would be possible to point out to Dali at least one question of a methodological nature that concerned them and which had not previously been discussed in Soviet literary life. This is so easily explained that it is enough to simply recall it.

The strangest thing that critics allow themselves is to suspect the artist of infidelity to his own work. And yet this is precisely what makes criticism artistic. To reveal the moral or socio-political resonance of the work, to highlight the cognitive-psychological moments in it, to assess its historical veracity - without all this, criticism would not fulfill its serious mission. However, none of these criteria, nor all of them together, are capable of achieving an artistic assessment. It can only be discussed when one penetrates the work's own logic - when one sees the internal expediency, in the spirit of which individual, even interesting in themselves, details would turn out to be unnecessary deviations or the shortcoming of "something" would stand out, undesirable roughnesses, imperfections, etc. would stand out. On this basis, the critic can make artistic demands on the author. And we would be making a grave mistake if we decided that we had entered a purely formal area.

There is a verse in "Faust" that can be translated as: "Our first step is free, with the second we are slaves!" This thought is all too appropriate for the artist, who, having once given free rein to his own imagination in "inventing" a new composition, soon becomes dependent on it. Should the same be said of the writer and art critic? How far does his freedom of choice extend? Is he not a slave to his own, previously preferred or subsequently guessed method? Such questions go so far in today's literary and art studies that they cast doubt on the possibility of a scientific interpretation of the work of art, or at the very least - treat this interpretation as something not quite as certain and expedient as was previously thought. Some contemporary authors believe that the methodological basis of artistic interpretation is only just being formed or is yet to be formed; others are convinced that a scientific analysis of the work is possible only insofar as it does not feed interpretative claims, i.e., insofar as it renounces interpretation in the traditional sense of the term. All those who today argue for "modern" literary studies and art studies, however, mercilessly attack attempts to reveal the meaning of artistic images by establishing historical, biographical, etc. facts. This was yesterday's word for dubious knowledge.