To the question of aesthetics as science

Every science is a science precisely because it studies, explains, and determines first and foremost what is common (a property, an essential relationship, a law) in the things and phenomena it studies. A science that is incapable of discovering and determining what is common in the object of its research is not and cannot be a science. This is, so to speak, an axiom confirmed by the entire development of all sciences without exception—philosophical and specific, natural and social, scientific-research and scientific-applied. Aesthetics as a science is no exception to this general rule. At the same time, everything that is general is general precisely because it is given in dialectical unity with the particular and the individual. The general, which does not constitute the deep and ever deeper essence of particular and individual things, but exists as pure, bare generality in and of itself and for itself, ceases in fact to have the character and significance of the general and becomes some kind of abstract, metaphysical and ultimately mystical idea, which in various idealistic theories acquires the meaning of a transcendental divine principle or some kind of transcendental value, etc. Something that is not common to at least two things (objects, phenomena) is not and cannot be common and therefore is not and cannot be any scientific concept, category, or law.